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INRE TRULIA: REVISITED AND REVITALIZED
INTRODUCTION
After an escalation in deal litigation that culminated with chal-
lenges to 95% of $100,000,000 deals,' merger objection litigation
that ends in disclosure-only settlements has become a topic of great
concern. 2 These cases are concerning because it seems implausible
that 95% of all mergers are executed carelessly. 3 The problematic
cases all follow a similar pattern. When a merger is announced,
multiple shareholder plaintiffs challenge the transaction in multi-
ple jurisdictions.4 Plaintiffs and corporate defendants then quickly
agree to a disclosure-only settlement, wherein the plaintiffs receive
trivial supplemental disclosures about the transaction.5 In return,
defendants receive a broad release from liability for future claims. 6
The parties then seek the court's approval of the settlement, and
upon receiving approval, the plaintiffs' attorney is rewarded with
significant attorney's fees.' This cycle is so common it has been
dubbed a "deal tax" or "transaction tax."8
1. Anthony Rickey & Keola R. Whittaker, Will Trulia Drive "Merger Tax" Suits Out of
Delaware?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 29,
2016, at 1.
2. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891-97 (Del. Ch. 2016).
3. As one scholar noted: "[Jiust as merger objection litigation is not per se objectiona-
ble, neither are mergers and acquisitions themselves .... Yet an overwhelming majority of
large public company transactions result in litigation. And . .. it does not seem plausible
that 96% of large public company deals involve management wrongdoing . . . ." Browning
Jeffries, The Plaintiffs'Lawyer's Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing Business in Public
Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 55, 68 (2014).
4. Rickey & Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1.
5. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 892-93.
6. Id. at 892.
7. Id. at 893; Rickey & Whittaker, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Jeffries, supra note 3, at 108 ("[P]laintiffs' attorneys have successfully attached
what amounts to a transaction tax to an overwhelming majority of large public company
deals."); Daniel Fisher, Delaware Judge Tells Plaintiff Lawyers: The M&A Deal Tax' Game
Is Over, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/20
15/09/18/delaware-judge-tells-plaintiff-lawyers-the-ma-deal-tax-game-is-over/ ("Critics-
including some Delaware judges-have called the tactic a combination of 'deal tax' and'deal
insurance'. .. .").
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This cycle is problematic for several reasons. First, many of the
cases are meritless. 9 It has been argued that the lack of merit can
be seen by three common features of these cases: plaintiffs filing
immediately after the merger is announced and then failing to lit-
igate,' 0 plaintiffs filing in multiple jurisdictions," and the parties
quickly reaching settlements that provide monetary value for
plaintiffs' attorneys but not for the shareholders. 12
These suits are also problematic because allowing this to con-
tinue is harmful in the long run for defendant corporations. This is
harmful because when considering if they should merge, defendant
corporations must automatically factor in paying significant
amounts of extra money as a deal tax, even when the transaction
is executed legally. In addition to harming defendant corporations,
the cycle limits the effectiveness of the legal system in separating
good from bad mergers. If every merger is challenged, the stigma
associated with being sued diminishes, which reduces the deter-
rent value of litigation.13
Finally, merger objection suits ending in disclosure-only settle-
ments are concerning because plaintiff shareholders risk surren-
dering valuable future claims by granting defendant corporations
broad releases in exchange for trivial disclosures.14 For example,
9. Jeffries, supra note 3, at 68.
10. Id. at 69-74.
11. Id. at 74-80. While most public companies are incorporated in Delaware, one study
proved that only 16% of suits challenging Delaware corporations were solely challenged in
the Delaware Court of Chancery. Id. at 74.
12. Id. at 80-86. Courts are permitted to award attorney's fees when there is a corpo-
rate benefit for the shareholders. Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147 (Del. 1980)
("[A]dditional fees might be sought on the basis of the 'results accomplished for the benefit
of all shareholders . . . .' That is the common yardstick by which a plaintiffs counsel is com-
pensated in a successful derivative action."). In these suits, the corporate benefit allegedly
comes from disclosing additional information which helps shareholders cast informed votes
on the merger, but research shows these disclosures do not actually affect shareholder vot-
ing. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Em-
pirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEx. L. REV. 557, 561 (2015).
13. Sean Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by
Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1, 26 (2015) [hereinafter Griffith, Correcting
Corporate Benefit] ("[B]ad actors are not plausibly deterred by a litigation system that ex-
poses the corporation to little more than payment of attorneys' fees. Moreover, the common
perception that such claims lack merit-a view fueled by the high volume of filings and the
dearth of significant recoveries-itself diminishes the reputational impact of being made to
defendant a suit.").
14. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 241, at *22 (Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (discussing how the releases granted to defendants
go far beyond the value of the extra disclosures).
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in In re Rural/Metro Corporation Stockholders Litigation, after
deeming it a "very close call," the Delaware Court of Chancery ul-
timately rejected the proposed disclosure-only settlement.15 Had
the court approved this settlement, the case would not have gone
to trial and plaintiffs would not have received over $75,000,000 in
damages plus other post-litigation awards.16 These three concerns
make it clear that disclosure-only settlements for merger objection
lawsuits are problematic.
However, this problem is difficult to solve. Shareholder litiga-
tion, which includes these cases, is different from other types of
litigation.17 Typically, there are three parties involved in supervis-
ing litigation: parties to the litigation, courts, and legislatures.1 8 To
date, these gatekeepers have been ineffective in monitoring this
problem. In these cases, plaintiffs are not directly involved in man-
aging their attorneys and their cases, but instead defer to the
plaintiffs' attorneys, creating an agency relationship. 19 Defendants
are not effective in helping monitor this problem because defend-
ant corporations have incentives to perpetuate this cycle. 20 Courts
cannot control suits brought outside their jurisdiction, 21 and the
legislature cannot pass legislation that is effective outside the
state's borders.22
Delaware has tried to solve this problem since it uniquely affects
Delaware. As the epicenter of corporate law, and as a state depend-
ent on its reputation as such, Delaware has a vested interest in
maintaining the integrity of its corporate law regime. 23 Delaware
15. In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 239 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff'd
sub norn. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
16. In re Rural/Metro Corp., 102 A.3d at 263. Similar outcomes occurred in other cases.
See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., S'holder Litig., No. 9079-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 224, at
*158 (Ch. Aug. 27, 2015); In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *155 (Ch. May 3, 2004).
17. Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers of Shareholder Litigation, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 237,
241 (2017) [hereinafter Erickson, Gatekeepers].
18. See id. at 240.
19. Id. at 245.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. Cf. Erickson, Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 257.
22. See Lesley Daunt, State us. Federal Law: Who Really Holds the Trump Card?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lesley-dau
nt/state-vs-federal-law-who-_b_4676579.html.
23. See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-
governance/502487/.
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set forth two solutions. First, the legislature adopted Delaware
General Corporate Law ("DGCL") section 115, which permits cor-
porations to enact forum selection provisions. 24 This helps because
Delaware judges are better equipped to scrutinize these cases. Sec-
ond, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation ("Trulia"), and held disclosure-only settle-
ments were impermissible unless plaintiffs requested supple-
mental disclosures that were "plainly material" to the merger doc-
uments. 25 The court also held that future disclosure-only
settlements would be approached with disfavor, indicating the
court would apply a heightened standard of review to these settle-
ments. 26
After Delaware's efforts, statistics show that while merger ob-
jection litigation has decreased in Delaware, it has increased in
many other jurisdictions. 27 This indicates that although Trulia has
been effective in deterring plaintiffs' attorneys from trying their
luck with disclosure-only settlements in Delaware, plaintiffs' attor-
neys are still seeking to file these suits in alternative forums with
lower standards of review. If the suits are going elsewhere, Dela-
ware has not solved the problem and needs to adjust the strategy.
The Delaware legislature can solve the disclosure-only settle-
ment problem by amending DGCL section 115, which authorizes
forum selection bylaws. Under the current section 115, when cor-
porations are sued they can choose whether to exercise their forum
selection bylaws to bring the suit back to Delaware. 28 The legisla-
ture should amend section 115 to prevent forum selection bylaws
from being optional-to no longer allow corporations to decline to
exercise a forum selection bylaw. Thus, if a Delaware corporation
24. 80 Del. Laws, c. 40, § 5 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
25. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016).
26. See id.
27. Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, - VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2922121; Kevin LaCroix, 2016 Securities Lawsuit Filings Surge to Record Levels, D&O
DIARY (Jan. 2, 2017) [hereinafter LaCroix, 2016 Securities Lawsuit Filings], http://www.
dandodiary.com/2017/01/articles/securities-litigation/2016-securities-lawsuit-filings-surge-
record-levels/.
28. Tit. 8, § 115; Kevin LaCroix, More About Litigation Reform Bylaws: Will 'No Pay"
Provisions Succeed Where Forum Selection Bylaws Have Failed?, D&O DIARY (Jan. 22, 2017)
[hereinafter LaCroix, Litigation Reform Bylaws], http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/01/arti
cles/securities-laws/litigation-reform-bylaws-will-no-pay-provisions-succeed-forum-selectio
n-bylaws-failed/.
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has a forum selection bylaw, as many do, any case filed in another
jurisdiction that objects to the corporation's merger will be brought
back to Delaware to be litigated. Once in Delaware, the court will
subject any proposed settlement to the heightened standard of
Trulia. Plaintiffs, knowing they will be subjected to Delaware's
heightened standard of review, will no longer bring these suits;
thus, Delaware's non-optional forum selection clause will operate
as a deterrent, which will effectively end disclosure-only settle-
ments in merger objection litigation.
Part I examines the problem presented, Delaware's attempts to
solve the problem, and why Delaware's efforts have not been effec-
tive. Part II considers the variety of other solutions that have been
posed by academics and courts and each solution's respective limi-
tations. Part III explores non-optional forum selection provisions
as a remedy to the problems that Delaware has not yet solved.
I. DISCLOSURE-ONLY SETTLEMENTS: THE PROBLEM AND THE
RESPONSE
This problematic sue-and-settle cycle exists because the tradi-
tional entities that oversee shareholder litigation are ineffective in
responding to this phenomenon. In recent years, Delaware has at-
tempted to spell out the end of these suits with both statutes that
allow forum selection bylaws, and judicial decisions, like Trulia,
which subject disclosure-only settlements to a heightened level of
judicial scrutiny. 29 However, Delaware's attempts have not been
entirely effective and, thus, Delaware has not yet completely solved
the problem. 30 This Part examines how the problem arose, how
Delaware tried to fix it, and why this was not effective.
A. The Rise of the Problematic Disclosure-Only Settlement
Disclosure-only settlement cases have become prevalent because
shareholder litigation is different from other types of litigation.
Typically, in litigation we rely on plaintiffs to supervise their at-
29. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 895-96; Cain et al., supra note 27, at 4 (discussing Dela-
ware's legislative efforts).
30. See generally Cain et al., supra note 27.
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torney and their case, and to ensure the attorney acts in the plain-
tiffs' best interests. 31 However, in shareholder litigation, the stakes
for individual plaintiffs are so low that plaintiffs are not actively
engaged in monitoring the attorney and their case. 32 Instead, the
plaintiffs' attorney acts as the representative agent for all the
shareholders. 33 Existence of this agency relationship produces a
need for other supervision. 34
If plaintiffs cannot monitor their own suits, the next line of de-
fense should be the defendants. Typically, when faced with merit-
less litigation, defendants will fight plaintiffs in court. However, in
these cases, defendants do not fight back for several reasons. First,
there is a cost asymmetry that incentivizes rational defendants to
settle.35 Defendants have all the relevant documentation and in-
formation and thus bear the burden of all discovery costs, whereas
the plaintiff will have virtually no discovery costs. 36 Going through
discovery and fighting the litigation in court will cost the defendant
more than settling. Second, there is also a risk asymmetry. These
cases create the risk that the defendants' sale of their company will
not go through.37 Defendants have a vested interest in ensuring the
transaction proceeds, and the risk that it may not encourages de-
fendants to quickly settle to make the problem go away. In con-
trast, plaintiffs have very little on the line. Third, defendants are
motivated by the broad release in liability they receive in exchange
for the disclosures, as this broad release serves as a type of "deal
insurance" that protects the merger in the future.38 Finally, de-
fendants are also interested in obtaining quick settlements to
31. Erickson, Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 241.
32. Id. at 238.
33. Id.
34. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679-80 (1986). A system that places an attorney at the helm of litiga-
tion without client supervision creates potential for "opportunism and overenforcement" by
the plaintiffs' attorneys because the disengagement of the plaintiffs in shareholder litigation
creates agency costs and because attorneys have incentives to sue where plaintiffs do not.
Id.
35. Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 73 (2016).
36. Id.
37. See Geoffrey H. Coll & Marco Molina, The End of Disclosure-Only Settlements in
Securities Class Actions?, BAKERHOSTETLER (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.bakerlaw.com/
alerts/-the-end-of-disclosure-only-settlements-in-securities-class-actions.
38. In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
241, at *11-12 (Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (discussing the incentives of defendants).
534 [Vol. 52:529
avoid litigating in multiple forums. 39 The presence of these incen-
tives to settle prevents defendants from acting as effective gate-
keepers.
The second traditional gatekeeper is the courts. Delaware courts
are an ideal gatekeeper for this type of case. Delaware has unique
experience with corporate law and a vested interest in maintaining
the integrity of corporate law, because it depends financially on its
reputation as the corporate law epicenter. 40 However, in these
cases, the courts have not been effective gatekeepers. First, Dela-
ware courts do not have jurisdiction outside state borders, and are
thus ineffective any time a disclosure-only settlement is presented
to any non-Delaware court. 41 Second, the manner in which Dela-
ware courts review these settlements is challenging. Delaware
courts must approve any proposed class action settlement, 42 and
courts applying Delaware law should do so, when the settlement is
reasonable and intrinsically fair, as judged at the settlement hear-
ing.4 3 In these cases, defendants and plaintiffs are very motivated
to proceed with the settlement, regardless of reasonableness or
fairness; as such, the settlement hearings turn into cheerleading
campaigns where both parties try to convince the court the settle-
ment is fair. 44 Additionally, neither party has any motivation to
bring anything negative to the judge's attention. 45 Faced with lim-
ited time, limited information, and enthusiastic support, there is
no reason for the judge not to bless the settlement. Without more,
this renders courts ineffective as gatekeepers.
39. Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdiction Litigation: Who
Caused This Problem, and Can It be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2012). If defendants
settle, through res judicata, settling in one state precludes all other settlements. See In re
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 7455-CB (Del. Ch. May 13, 2016).
40. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware's
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 67 (2009).
41. See Erickson, Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 239, 257.
42. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e).
43. In re Triarc Cos., 791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001) (quoting In re Caremark Int'l,
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
44. Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the
Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can't, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING
TIMES (Steven D. Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds.) (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6)
[hereinafter Griffith, Private Ordering], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950.
45i qee. id.
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The final gatekeeper is the legislature, who can use statutes to
attempt to fix the problem.46 However, the legislature cannot easily
fix this problem either, since any law passed in Delaware is not
going to affect the merger objection suits filed in other states. Thus,
limited jurisdiction prevents the legislature from easily acting as
the gatekeeper in these cases.
With shareholder litigation of this type, the traditional gate-
keepers are ineffective. This has led to the prevalence of merger
objection cases ending in disclosure-only settlements, since none of
the traditional gatekeepers have exercised sufficient oversight.
Given the inability of each to be effective standing alone, there
should be multiple supervisors acting in conjunction to fix the prob-
lem, as one can solve the problems the other cannot. 47
B. Delaware Courts Tried to Fix the Problem
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently tried to eliminate dis-
closure-only settlements with Trulia.4 8 In Trulia, the court ruled
that going forward, deal litigation disclosure settlements would be
approached with continued disfavor and that disclosure-only set-
tlements for merger objection suits would be critically examined.49
In Trulia, a shareholder class action challenged Zillow, Inc.'s
("Zillow") proposed acquisition of Trulia, Inc. ("Trulia").50 After the
merger was announced, four Trulia shareholders quickly sued, al-
leging Trulia's board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by
approving an unfair exchange ratio.51 Instead of litigating, plain-
tiffs and defendants quickly reached a settlement in which Trulia
was required to produce supplemental disclosures to help the
shareholders cast an informed vote.52 In return, plaintiffs dropped
the motion to enjoin the transaction and provided Trulia with a
broad release from future claims. 53
46. See Erickson, Gatekeepers, supra note 17, at 250, 252.
47. See id. at 239-40.
48. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
49. Id. at 898.
50. Id. at 886.
51. Id. at 888-89.
52. Id. at 887, 889.
53. Id. at 887.
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The chancellor of the Court of Chancery, Chancellor Bouchard,
rejected this proposed settlement, stating the supplemental disclo-
sures were so trivial they were not material or even helpful to
Trulia's voting shareholders.54 The disclosures were so trivial that
they also did not serve as meaningful consideration to warrant
providing the defendants with the broad release.55 Chancellor Bou-
chard proceeded to do more than reject the settlement; he made it
clear Delaware would no longer welcome this type of settlement by
stating,
Practitioners should expect ... disclosure settlements are likely to be
met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental
disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission
.... In using the term "plainly material," I mean that it should not be
a close call that the supplemental information is material . . . .56
With this language, Chancellor Bouchard may have signaled the
demise of disclosure-only settlements in Delaware.
C. Delaware's Solution Helped but Did Not Help Enough
The court's decision in Trulia was meant to send a message to.
plaintiffs' attorneys that these suits were no longer welcome in
Delaware. By holding that settlements would be rejected in the ab-
sence of "plainly material" disclosures, the court eliminated the in-
centive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring these suits where the in-
centive is the attorney's fees accompanying settlement approvaL
The requirement of a higher standard would hopefully result in
suits of a higher quality, which would focus more on providing
shareholders with benefits.5 7 In addition, by saying enough is
enough, the decision in Trulia would hopefully help preserve "Del-
aware's credibility as an honest broker in the legal realm."5 8
54. Id. at 904, 907.
55. Id. at 907.
56. Id. at 898.
57. Peter J. Walsh, Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Trulia and the Demise of "Disclosure Only"
Settlements in Delaware, Bus. L. TODAY (Feb. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publica
tions/blt/2016/02/delawareinsider.html.
58. Transcript of Record at 66, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. No.7930-VCL
(Del. Ch. July 8, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/07/acevedovaerofl
ex-settlementhearingtranscript.pdf.
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Trulia may have helped some of these goals, but the preliminary
statistics indicate that an unintended result of Delaware's height-
ened level of scrutiny is the exodus of plaintiffs' attorneys out of
Delaware and into other forums.59 The statistics show that while
deal litigation has declined significantly in Delaware after Trulia,
it has increased in other states and in federal court. 60 Thus, while
the Delaware Court of Chancery's attempt to fix the problem does
appear to be working in Delaware, the problem is still not re-
solved-plaintiffs' attorneys are still bringing meritless merger ob-
jection suits to obtain a disclosure-only settlement and attorney's
fees.
II. PROPOSED FIXES To MERITLESS DISCLOSURE-ONLY
SETTLEMENTS
Accompanying the rise in disclosure-only settlements was a va-
riety of solutions proposed to help end this phenomenon. These so-
lutions included legislative approaches, judicial approaches, and
federalization. Each solution has certain benefits, but also presents
unique challenges that make them less viable. This Part examines
each proposed solution and lays out the benefits and downsides of
each.
A. Legislative Solutions
The legislature could help eliminate disclosure-only settlements
for merger objection litigation in a variety of ways. Proposed legis-
lative solutions include forum selection bylaws, shifting attorney's
fees, and no pay provisions.
1. Forum Selection Provisions
Forum selection provisions regulate where a shareholder may
bring suit against the corporation and are proposed as a way to
59. Cain et al., supra note 27, at 6, 22. Overall, merger litigation has declined. In 2014,
91% of all transactions were challenged. Id. at 6. In 2015, that number declined to 89%, and
fell further to 73% in 2016. Id. However, litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery has
decreased, but litigation elsewhere has increased. Id. Of the completed transactions in 2016,
only 32% were challenged in Delaware, whereas 65% were challenged in other states and
37% were challenged in federal court. Id.
60. Id. at 22-23.
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curb abuse associated with disclosure-only settlements.61 Forum
selection provisions can be placed in a corporation's bylaws or arti-
cles of incorporation, and when inevitable litigation is filed after
the corporation has proposed a merger, corporations can exercise
the forum selection provision to bring the suit back to Delaware. 62
Having the suit back in Delaware will help curb abuse because
judges in a Delaware court will review the suit under Trulia's
heightened standard. If the proposed settlement is meritless, the
court will find the disclosures are not plainly material and decline
to approve the settlement. 63 Forum selection provisions also have
deterrent value, since simply knowing the case will end up in Del-
aware and will be reviewed under Trulia's heightened standard
will likely dissuade plaintiffs' attorneys who are simply seeking
easy attorney's fees from filing meritless suits.
Forum selection bylaws have received widespread approval. The
Delaware Court of Chancery authorized forum selection bylaws in
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation,64
holding forum selection bylaws were authorized under DGCL sec-
tion 109(b) because they govern disputes related to the internal af-
fairs of the corporation.65 After Boilermakers, the Delaware legis-
lature gave statutory approval to the holding with DGCL section
115, which authorizes corporations to include a provision in their
articles of incorporation or bylaws requiring that "any or all inter-
nal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any
or all of the courts in this State."6 6 As defined in the statute,
.'[i]nternal corporate claims' means claims, including claims in the
right of the corporation, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty
by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such ca-
pacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the
Court of Chancery."67 After the enactment of DGCL section 115,
61. Jack B. Jacobs, New DGCL Amendments Endorse Forum Selection Clauses and Pro-
hibit Fee-Shifting, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 17, 2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edul2015/06/17/new-dgel-amendments-endorse-forum-select
ion-clauses-and-prohibit-fee-shifting/.
62. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 605.
63. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887 (Del. Ch. 2016).
64. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch.
2013).
65. Id. at 962-63; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
66. 80 Del. Laws, c. 40, § 5 (2015) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (Cum. Supp.
2016)).
67. Tit. 8, § 115.
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many corporations were quick to adopt forum selection provi-
sions. 68 In addition, in Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard endorsed the
use of forum selection provisions as an additional way to counter-
act disclosure-only settlements. 69
Forum selection bylaws are helpful but cannot solve the problem
on their own for several reasons. First, forum selection bylaws are
not automatically executing-defendant corporations must choose
to invoke them. 70 Given these defendants' incentives to engage in
this cycle, they do not always invoke their forum selection bylaw,
but only do so when it is in their best interest.7 1 The ease with
which corporate defendants can choose not to invoke these provi-
sions, and their failure to do so, can be seen as a "revealed prefer-
ence" that "demonstrates defendants' continued interest in retain-
ing the option of a cheap settlement and a broad release in an
alternative jurisdiction." 7 2 The result is that these provisions do
not function as exclusive forum provisions, but rather as "[e]xclu-
sive [florum options."73
The second problem with forum selection provisions is that they
are ineffective when plaintiffs file in federal court, as opposed to
state court. Plaintiffs can frame a merger objection lawsuit in fed-
eral terms and append a state merger claim to that federal case. 74
For example, plaintiffs can sue in federal court alleging the com-
pany's proxy statements omitted material information in violation
of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") and as a violation of Rule 14a-9. 75 This subjects the claim to
section 27 of the Exchange Act, which gives federal courts exclusive
68. Cain et al., supra note 27, at 4-5.
69. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016).
70. LaCroix, Litigation Reform Bylaws, supra note 28.
71. Alison Frankel, How Corporations Can Game Their Own Forum Selection Clauses,
REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2015), http:/fblogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/11/17/how-corpora
tions-can-game-their-own-forum-selection-clauses/ (discussing FX Energy's manipulation of
the corporation's forum selection clause); see also Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44,
at 12 (There are "plain examples of the opportunistic use of forum selection provisions by
defendants-situations, that is, in which companies with forum selection bylaws have cho-
sen not to assert them but have instead settled instead [sic] (for non-monetary relief) in an
alternative jurisdiction.").
72. Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5-6.
75. Id. at 9.
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jurisdiction over actions alleging violations of the Exchange Act.7 6
If plaintiffs append a state claim to this federal claim, that must
only be brought in federal court, the forum selection clause will not
command the suit back to Delaware. A federal court judge could
decline jurisdiction over the state law claims, but probably would
not. The other claim has to be made in federal court under section
27, and it does not make sense to separate the two claims.77 Thus,
forum selection provisions can be thwarted in this way by plain-
tiffs' attorneys, and the preliminary data shows this is in fact oc-
curring.78
While forum selection provisions cannot solve the problem on
their own, they may help when used in conjunction with other
tools. This is clear because many corporations have already en-
acted forum selection provisions as they are statutorily authorized
and will be upheld in court. 79
2. Shifting Attorney's Fees
A second legislative solution is enabling fee-shifting provisions.
These provisions impose the cost of attorney's fees for certain types
of shareholder litigation upon the plaintiff.80 Fee-shifting provi-
sions curb abuse by forcing plaintiffs to have more skin in the
game, since they risk being forced to pay extraordinarily high at-
torney's fees. This risk will deter plaintiffs from bringing these
suits.8 1
This solution was initially welcomed by corporate officers and
directors, because fee-shifting provisions naturally chill litiga-
tion.82 The Delaware Court of Chancery also initially endorsed fee-
shifting provisions in these cases in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher
Tennis Bund ("ATP Tour").83 In ATP Tour, the board adopted a fee-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 11.
78. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 27, at 17 (noting the rise in state appraisal claims
brought by plaintiffs' attorneys in federal merger litigation).
79. Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44, at 2.
80. DEL. CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNcIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 1
(2015) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF PROPOSAL], http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/
files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECOND-PROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U012451
3.pdf.
81. Id. at 3-4.
82. Id. at 3.
83. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014).
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shifting provision in the bylaws that required the plaintiffs to pay
all attorney's fees and expenses incurred during internal corporate
litigation if the plaintiffs failed to substantially achieve "the full
remedy sought."84 The court held fee-shifting provisions in bylaws
were valid and enforceable under the DGCL.86 When the court up-
held the fee-shifting provision at issue in ATP Tour, no Delaware
statute forbade fee-shifting bylaws. 86
While fee-shifting provisions make sense as a natural deterrent,
there are too many problems with this solution for it to be truly
viable. After ATP Tour, the Delaware Corporate Council (the
"Council") quickly proposed legislation prohibiting fee-shifting un-
der these circumstances.8 7 The Council identified three main prob-
lems with fee-shifting.88 First, fee-shifting provisions would have a
severe effect on shareholder litigation, since the risk of the suit for
shareholders (paying high attorney's fees) would significantly out-
weigh the potential gain (non-monetary settlement).89 Anything
that severely chills shareholder litigation is discouraged, since
shareholder litigation is one of the few ways shareholders can mon-
itor corporations and boards.90
Second, fee-shifting provisions would curtail the development of
corporate common law. 91 Delaware corporate law relies on the law
of fiduciary duty, administered by the courts, to fill in the gaps that
the DGCL does not cover. 92 For example, the DGCL does not cover
many tools that corporations frequently employ, such as poison
pills. 93 Instead, these tools are regulated through the common
law. 9 4 Common law is developed through shareholder litigation, so
stifling shareholder litigation would stifle Delaware common law.95
84. Id. at 556.
85. Id. at 560.
86. See id. at 558.
87. EXPLANATION OF PROPOSAL, supra note 80, at 3.
88. See id. at 3-6.
89. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 13, at 3. Fee-shifting provisions
make bringing these suits "economically irrational" for plaintiff shareholders, so it is un-
likely they will continue to use shareholder litigation as a tool to enforce their rights.
EXPLANATION OF PROPOSAL, supra note 80, at 3.
90. See EXPLANATION OF PROPOSAL, supra note 80, at 6.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 4-5.
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A third problem the Council identified is that eliminating share-
holder litigation would "eliminate the only extant regulation of
substantive corporate law." 96 No government body regulates the
relationship between shareholders and management, so the only
method for addressing management misconduct is through share-
holder litigation.97 Minimizing the impact of shareholder litigation
would eliminate the only effective enforcement mechanism for
statutory or fiduciary obligations.98 If regulation diminished over
time and statutory rights and fiduciary obligations became essen-
tially meaningless, investors would eventually lose confidence in
corporations, which would negatively affect capital formation. 99
The Delaware legislature recognized all the problems posed by
fee-shifting provisions, and in response, amended DGCL section
109(b). 100 Section 109(b) disallows this type of fee-shifting by stat-
ing, "[t]he bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose
liability on a stockholder for the attorneys' fees or expenses of the
corporation or any other party in connection with an internal cor-
porate claim . . . ."101 This statutory rejection, along with the vari-
ety of problems fee-shifting provisions present in this context,
makes it clear that fee-shifting provisions are not the correct ap-
proach for this problem.
3. No Pay Provisions
A third legislative solution is a no pay provision, which has been
proposed within academia. A no pay provision bars a corporation
from reimbursing plaintiffs for attorney's fees and expenses result-
ing from merger litigation. 102 Corporations pre-commit not to pay
in advance in litigation when they are not influenced by the variety
of incentives to settle. 103 Under these circumstances, defendants
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 80 Del. Laws, c. 40, § 3 (2015) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (Cum.
Supp. 2016)).
101. Tit. 8, § 109(b).
102. See Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44, at 3.
103. Id. at 14.
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can see clearly enough to prioritize the desire to not pay meritless
settlements over the short-term incentives. 104
In contrast to other solutions, no pay provisions have certain ad-
vantages. Unlike fee-shifting provisions, no pay provisions are
more likely to be enforceable because they are different in several
ways.10 5 The no pay provision does not impose the risk of paying
significant fees on shareholders.1 06 Accordingly, the no pay provi-
sion does not punish plaintiffs, so many of the concerns with fee-
shifting, like chilling shareholder litigation, are not raised. 107 No
pay provisions do not face the optionality problem of forum selec-
tion provisions because corporations can make the no pay provi-
sions binding.10 8 The non-optionality will help deter litigation,
since plaintiffs' attorneys will be more hesitant to sue if they know
the corporation cannot automatically pay attorney's fees and ex-
penses. 109
However, there are also many problems with no pay provisions.
First, some companies may hesitate to adopt these because "they
will lose the ability in some future dispute of being able to just pay
the plaintiffs' lawyers to go away."110 Defendants may prefer to re-
tain their ability to provide trivial supplemental disclosures to en-
sure the transaction goes through. Second, there is the concern
that "overly extensive efforts to restrict the availability of share-
holder remedies could wind up eliminating the availability of rem-
edies for meritorious claims."11 1 In some cases, non-monetary relief
may be the right remedy. Third, this solution could prevent meri-
torious claims from being pursued, and "merger objection litiga-
tion, in its pure form, can provide a useful function in policing man-
agement to make sure the shareholders are not getting harmed in
104. See id.
105. See id. at 16.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 17.
109. See id. at 18.
110. LaCroix, Litigation Reform Bylaws, supra note 28.
111. Kevin LaCroix, A 'Tidal Wave of Change" in Merger Objection Litigation, D&O
DIARY (Mar. 2, 2017) [hereinafter LaCroix, Tidal Wave of Change], http://www.dandodia
ry.com/2017/03/articles/merger-litigation/tidal-wave-change-merger-objection-litigation/.
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the process of a deal." 112 A blanket restriction on fees for plaintiffs'
attorneys eliminates their incentive to bring even the good suits.113
Delaware courts must strike the appropriate balance between
protecting shareholders and limiting litigation abuse, and a blan-
ket restriction on attorney's fees in this type of suit may tip the
balance too far away from protecting shareholders. 1 14 Thus, while
no pay provisions may be a helpful tool, they are not sufficient on
their own to prevent abuses.
B. Judicial Solutions
Judicial solutions are a very effective way to monitor these cases.
Proposed solutions include courts no longer awarding plaintiffs' at-
torney's fees and the solution from Trulia.
1. Stop Awarding Attorney's Fees
The first proposed judicial solution is for courts to stop awarding
plaintiffs' attorney's fees for achieving a disclosure-only settle-
ment. Under the corporate benefit doctrine, attorney's fees are
awarded when the litigation provides benefits for the sharehold-
ers. 115 Research shows the supplemental disclosures obtained in
these cases do not provide the shareholders any benefits.1 1 6 Accord-
ingly, since shareholders are not receiving benefits, there is no rea-
son for courts to award attorney's fees for disclosure-only settle-
ments. 117 Without the incentive of attorney's fees, there is no
reason for plaintiffs' attorneys to continue bringing these meritless
suits.1 18
112. Jeffries, supra note 3, at 57.
113. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 13, at 30 ("The problem ... is not
that they deter shareholder litigation, but that they deter it indiscriminately .. . tak[ing] no
account of the merits of the underlying claim and, considering the amplified deterrent effect
on representative actions, thus will discourage good and bad cases alike from ever being
brought.").
114. See LaCroix, Tidal Wave of Change, supra note 111.
115. See United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997);
Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147 (Del. 1980).
116. See Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 561.
117. Id.
118 See id. at 561-62.
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While this solution logically makes sense, it is too broad to suc-
ceed. First, Delaware judges' hands are tied. While they would pre-
fer to not award attorney's fees, if they refuse to do so they would
drive merger litigation away from Delaware. 119 Delaware depends
heavily on its reputation as the epicenter of corporate law, and as
such, judges do not want to act against their own self-interest by
forcing the cases to leave the state. Proponents of this solution ar-
gue that this can be avoided through the use of forum selection
clauses; 120 however, as discussed above, the various problems with
forum selection clauses prevent them from truly eliminating the
problem.
A second problem with a blanket restriction on attorney's fees is
that it will chill shareholder litigation. As discussed in the context
of no pay provisions, plaintiffs' attorneys need incentives to bring
even the good suits, and eliminating the incentives will dispose of
both good and bad cases. Anything that too significantly chills
shareholder litigation in this way is discouraged. 121 Given these
problems, no pay provisions are not a sufficient solution.
2. Trulia
Trulia presented a judicial solution which proposed the courts
subject these settlements to a heightened standard of review. If the
disclosures that the plaintiffs have settled for are not "plainly ma-
terial," the Delaware court will not approve the settlement. 122
Trulia has several advantages over the other proposed solutions.
First, Trulia has been a strong deterrent in Delaware for plaintiffs'
attorneys.123 After Trulia, the number of merger litigation suits de-
creased, which logically points to plaintiffs' attorneys being con-
cerned about the heightened standard of review. 124 Second, Trulia
avoids many of the other critical problems that other solutions cre-
119. Id. at 604.
120. Id. at 605.
121. See generally EXPLANATION OF PROPOSAL, supra note 80, at 1-4.
122. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
123. Cain et al., supra note 27, at 6 ("[O]verall levels of merger litigation have declined
in the past year, suggesting that Delaware's effort to reduce frivolous litigation has been at
least partially successful.").
124. See LaCroix, Litigation Reform Bylaws, supra note 28.
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ate, such as chilling shareholder litigation and limiting meritori-
ous suitS.125 Under Trulia, it is still possible to obtain a disclosure-
only settlement for a merger objection case, but there is a require-
ment that the disclosures be valuable. 126 So, while Trulia's height-
ened settlement standard is high enough to dissuade meritless
suits, it is low enough that if the suits have real value, the standard
will not have a chilling effect on shareholder litigation.
However, Trulia is not without limitations. The primary concern
after Trulia is that plaintiffs' attorneys will not stop bringing friv-
olous suits, but will instead simply file in other forums that do not
have to apply Trulia's heightened settlement standard. 127 Early
statistics confirm that this is occurring because although there has
been a significant drop in the number of merger objection lawsuits
filed in Delaware, 128 there has been a rise of class actions filed in
the federal courts and a rise of suits filed in other states. 129
A second related concern is uniformity. If plaintiffs flee from Del-
aware and choose to file in alternate forums, Trulia is only effective
if other courts adopt the same standard or apply Delaware law. 130
125. See LaCroix, Tidal Wave of Change, supra note 111.
126. Kevin LaCroix, Cornerstone Research: Since Trulia, Merger Objection Lawsuit Fil-
ings Have Plunged, D&O DIARY (Aug. 2, 2016) [hereinafter LaCroix, Cornerstone Research],
http://www.dandodiary.com/2016/08/articles/director-and-officer-liability/cornerstone-resea
rch-since-trulia-merger-objection-lawsuit-filings-have-plunged/ ("It is worth noting that
Trulia did not establish that disclosure-only settlements would never survive judicial scru-
tiny but rather it established the features the Chancery Court will require in order for a
proposed settlement to pass muster. ... [Tihere are three ways to help a Chancery Court
M&A lawsuit settlement survive Trulia. The first is ensuring that the disclosures required
by the settlement are meaningful and substantive."). In fact, after Trulia, the Delaware
Court of Chancery has approved several settlements. Anthony Rickey, Approved Disclosure
Settlements Post-Trulia, MARGRAVE LAW LLC (Aug. 16, 2016), https://margravelaw.com/20
16/08/approved-disclosure-settlements-post-trulial (listing cases in which the ruling court
has approved disclosure settlements post-Trulia, including the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery).
127. LaCroix, Cornerstone Research, supra note 126.
128. Id.
129. LaCroix, 2016 Securities Lawsuit Filings, supra note 27 ('There were a total of 270
federal court securities class action lawsuits filed in 2016, which represents a whopping 43%
increase over the number of filings in 2015, when there were only 189 federal court securi-
ties suit [sic] filed."). In other states, filings have increased from 51% in 2015 to 65% in 2016.
Cain et al., supra note 27, at 22-23.
130. Chancellor Bouchard acknowledged this reality in Trulia, when he stated, "Finally,
some have expressed concern that enhanced judicial scrutiny of disclosure settlements could
lead plaintiffs to sue fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions in the hope
of finding a forum more hospitable to signing off on settlements of no genuine value.... We
hope and trust that our sister courts will reach the same conclusion if confronted with the
issue." In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (2016).
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Delaware law is frequently the correct choice of law in these cases,
even when the suit is filed outside of Delaware. In alternate fo-
rums, "Delaware law applies to matters of substance, and the law
of the forum applies to matter of procedure."1 31 The rules governing
settlement approval are procedural, and in every jurisdiction, the
court must determine if the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and ad-
equate." 132 Courts consider several factors to determine this, in-
cluding the value of the disclosures. 133 Determining the value of
disclosures is a substantive question, so Delaware law controls. 134
After Trulia, the standard for determining the value of the disclo-
sures is whether they are "plainly material." 135
While the Trulia standard is controlling when applying Dela-
ware law, more times than not the judge in the alternate forum has
not even heard of the case since neither party at the settlement
hearing would have any incentive to bring Trulia to the judge's at-
tention. 136 Although Trulia technically controls, lack of knowledge
prevents the judge from applying this standard. Thus, uniformity
is a true challenge to the effectiveness of Trulia. This is made clear
by looking at the many post-Trulia disclosure-only settlements in-
volving Delaware corporations where Trulia was not raised. 137
C. Other Solutions
The final proposed solution is shifting disclosure policing to fed-
eral court with the federal securities laws. Under this regime, pub-
lic company merger disclosures would be policed by federal securi-
ties laws, and state laws would focus on the substantive fairness of
mergers. 138 The advantage to this solution is that litigation under
federal securities laws focuses specifically on deficiencies in disclo-
sures, whereas in state court merger litigation, claims are first
based on merger process and fair merger prices. 139 When plaintiffs
131. Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44, at 6.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 6-7.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 7-8 (discussing eight disclosure settlements, in four of which Trulia was never
raised).
138. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 602.
139. Id. at 591-92.
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cannot succeed on these counts, they then change the focus to sup-
plemental disclosures to ensure they receive attorney's fees. 14 0
Another advantage to shifting disclosure policing to federal
court is the depth and manner in which federal courts analyze the
disclosures. In federal court, misstatements and omissions from
disclosure documents are actionable only if material. 141 Federal
judges have developed a significant body of law concerning materi-
ality, and the issue will be fully briefed and argued by both par-
ties.142 State courts have also adopted a materiality standard, but
the standard is applied in a non-adversarial way in Delaware. 143
Thus, in contrast to federal courts, the issue is not fully briefed and
argued, so state court judges have less information when making
their decisions. In addition, Delaware courts decide cases "on an
expedited basis" because the parties want to quickly remove the
case as an obstacle to the transaction. 144 In contrast, cases in fed-
eral court are typically litigated after the transaction closes. 145 Ac-
cordingly, the rush to dispose of the cases before the transaction
closes is not a factor in federal courts, allowing them to review the
issues in more depth.146
Finally, proponents argue federal litigation is superior because
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") addresses
the potential for frivolous litigation by attempting to balance the
scope of required disclosures and the extent to which violations of
regulatory requirements are allowed to be challenged through liti-
gation. 147 In light of all these benefits of the federal system, the
federal solution proposes disclosure claims move to the federal
level. 148
However, the federal solution presents significant obstacles to
enforceability. First, the federal solution has faced backlash from
Delaware judges, who take issue with eliminating Delaware's role
140. Id. at 591.
141. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (quoting Mills v. Elec.
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)).
142. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 596.
143. Id. at 598-99.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 599.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 597-98.
148. Td. at 602.
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in these suits.149 Delaware courts will not give up their dominance
in corporate law since the state depends financially on their repu-
tation as a corporate law hub.150 In addition to concerns with elim-
inating Delaware's role, Delaware judges have pointed out that
this approach "would eliminate disclosure-only settlements, not
just disclosure-only fee awards."151
Opponents also point out that "federalization is a recurring aca-
demic response to the perceived shortcomings of the extant state-
based corporate law system... . [b]ut in the real world, the call for
federalization often rests on debatable premises." 152 Especially
here, the problem would not be fixed in the real world, since the
settlements would simply be relocated to federal court and not be
eliminated.153 In federal court, the settlements would be subject to
the PSLRA, which has substantive and procedural reforms that
are designed to discourage meritless challenges, such as height-
ened pleading standards. 154 While proponents believe this will
solve the problems, many others say that the PSLRA "has done
little to remedy several key problems." 155 Furthermore, this ig-
nores the fact that there is rarely opposition from corporate defend-
ants in these cases, because defendants like disclosure-only settle-
ments. 156 Thus, instead of solving the problem, the federal solution
merely relocates it "while harming [Delaware] corporate law in the
process."157
Final concerns include that, while proponents of the federal so-
lution tout the federal regulatory system's advancement and ro-
bust body of law, in other work, one of the same authors has argued
for a renewed federal oversight of takeover litigation premised on
the belief that federal regulators have failed to provide appropriate
149. See J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription for the Peppercorn Settlement Problem
in Merger Litigation, 93 TEx. L. REV. 129, 130 (2015) (outlining one vice chancellor of the
Delaware Court of Chancery's response and objections to the federal solution).
150. See Stevelman, supra note 40, at 57, 67.
151. Laster, supra note 149, at 129-30.
152. Id. at 131.
153. Id. at 132.
154. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 597.
155. Catherine Fredenburgh, 10 Years Later, Experts Call for PSLRA Reform, LAW360
(Feb. 21, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/securities/articles/5382/10-years-later-
experts-call-for-psira-reform.
156. Laster, supra note 149, at 145.
157. Id. at 132.
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national oversight. 158 Additionally, there is concern that federal
takeover-disclosure law would be influenced by political factors,
which are not present at the state level, as Delaware's economic
incentives encourage state lawmakers to retain a fair balance be-
tween protecting both managers and shareholders. 15 9
III. TRULIA CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM ALONE BUT TRULIA
"PLUS" WILL
In the same way that the alternative solutions discussed above
have problems, so too does Trulia. Yet unlike the other solutions,
Trulia fits well into the existing framework, and there is a reason-
able solution for the problems. By addressing and solving Trulia's
problems, an effective solution can be created to stop the problems
presented by disclosure-only merger objection lawsuits. Thus, this
part argues that Trulia "plus" an extra legislative step is the best
solution to this problem, where the extra legislative step is an
amendment to DGCL section 115 making exclusive forum provi-
sions non-optional.
A. Proposed Two-Part Solution
1. Retain Trulia
While Trulia faces problems on a nationwide scale, Trulia has
proven effective in Delaware. After Trulia, the volume of merger
litigation in Delaware has decreased, the number of cases dis-
missed has increased, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded
has decreased.16 0 In 2013, 96% of all merger objection lawsuits at-
tracted at least one lawsuit. 161 By contrast, in 2016 only 73% of all
transactions attracted at least one lawsuit. 162 In Delaware, the
number of challenged deals dropped from 61% in 2015 to 32% in
158. Id.
159. Id. at 132-33.
160. See LaCroix, 2016 Securities Lawsuit Filings, supra note 27; Cain et al., supra note
27, at 6-7.
161. Cain et al., supra note 27, at 22-23.
162 Td qt
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2016.163 Also in 2016, 22% of settlements were rejected or dis-
missed, in comparison to a 0% rate prior to 2014.164 Finally, the
median in awarded attorney's fees dropped from $575,000 in 2009
to $320,000 during 2016.165 These statistics show that the height-
ened standard in Delaware is enough of a deterrent for plaintiffs'
attorneys that they are less willing to try their chances, that judges
are less willing to bless these settlements, and that judges award
lower attorney's fees.
2. Enhance Trulia with a Legislative Amendment
In addition to retaining Trulia, the Delaware legislature should
amend DGCL section 115 to bolster Trulia. The statute should
specify that forum selection provisions cannot be waived when lit-
igation is already pending or inevitable-defendants should not be
able to game the system by waiving the provision when it works
for them. Amended section 115 should read:
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent
with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal
corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all
of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of incor-
poration or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts
of this State. [Such provision in the certificate of incorporation or by-
laws will not be later waivable by the corporation at a time when there
is a threat of litigation pending or litigating pending.] "Internal corpo-
rate claims" means claims, including claims in the right to the corpo-
ration, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or
former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to
which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery. 166
This amendment would reduce a corporation's ability to waive
the forum selection clause when faced with the threat of litigation,
and would force it to bring the suit to Delaware, where any poten-
tial settlement will face Trulia's heightened scrutiny.
163. Id. at 6, 22.
164. Id. at 24.
165. Id. at 27.
166. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (proposed amendment indicated
by italicized text).
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B. Why This Two-Step Solution Would Curb the Abuse
Trulia's primary challenges are keeping the merger objection
suits in Delaware and/or ensuring uniformity. If Delaware can
keep the suits within the state, uniformity among other courts is a
less pressing concern. If states across the nation adopt a uniform
approach, it is less concerning that the suits may not be filed in
Delaware since plaintiffs' attorneys will face the same deterrent
everywhere. Given that the challenges are inherently connected,
solving one would make the other a non-issue. Between confront-
ing uniformity or attempting to keep the suits in Delaware, keep-
ing the suits in Delaware is the challenge to solve for several rea-
sons.
1. Advantages of Keeping Merger Objection Suits in Delaware
The first reason merger objection suits ending in disclosure-only
settlements should stay in Delaware is because Delaware judges
are uniquely qualified to attack these settlements. The Delaware
Court of Chancery is entirely focused on corporate law, and a sub-
stantial number of the cases the court hears concern mergers.167
The focused jurisdiction allows Delaware judges to develop signifi-
cant expertise in corporate matters.168 Most corporations choose to
incorporate in Delaware, 169 largely so their disputes will be heard
in the Court of Chancery and so Delaware law will apply.170 Ac-
cordingly, funneling suits back to Delaware is advantageous for
both the corporations, who have their disputes heard in the Court
of Chancery, and for the market, because Delaware will apply a
heightened standard to deter meritless proceedings.
Another reason to keep the suits in Delaware is because Dela-
ware has a strong interest in solving this problem, so Delaware
167. Laster, supra 149, at 134.
168. Litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court,
DELAWARE.GOv, http://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-court-chancery-supreme-court (last
visited Nov. 15, 2017).
169. More than half of publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware, and two-
thirds of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. Semuels, supra note 23.
170. See Paul Sponaugle, The Court of Chancery: Part of the Delaware Advantage, HARV.
Bus. SERVS., INC.: THE HBS BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/the-
court-of-chancery-part-of-the-delaware-advantage/ (discussing how the Delaware Court of
Chancery is widely regarded as one of the best forums for settling corporate disputes).
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courts will give these cases significant attention. Delaware is very
financially dependent on their reputation as the preeminent state
for corporate law, as the "franchise taxes and filing fees paid annu-
ally by Delaware-incorporated entities make up a sizeable percent-
age of the state's annual tax revenue. . . . [A] drop in franchise fees
from existing or new charters could impair the state's budget, i.e.,
the funding of essential services including construction, education,
and health care." 171 Other states, which may be bigger and may not
depend on corporations to finance their education systems, do not
have the same motivation to put energy into this problem.
Considering the way these settlements appear before judges, it
is important that the reviewing judge has sufficient incentives to
really consider the settlement. A judge's task in reviewing and ap-
proving these settlements is complicated in three ways. 172 First,
the settlement process is usually non-adversarial, so the parties
have no incentives to show the judge anything negative about the
settlement. 173 Second, the process is quick and occurs before exten-
sive discovery has taken place, so the factual record presented to
the court at the settlement hearing is limited. 174 Third, because the
merger weighing in the balance is likely beneficial to the share-
holders, judges hesitate to place obstacles in the transaction's
path.175 Given these problems, it is important that judges have suf-
ficient incentives to give the settlements the full review they are
due, and the Delaware judges do have these incentives.
Finally, it is preferable for suits to stay in Delaware because Del-
aware law is predictable. Courts in other states may not be willing
to follow Trulia or may simply not know about Trulia. After Trulia,
at least one non-Delaware court has declined to follow it,176 and
several cases have been settled where Trulia was not brought to
the court's attention. 177 In contrast, other non-Delaware courts
171. Stevelman, supra note 40, at 67.
172. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 569.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. For example, in Gordon v. Verizon Communications, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, declined to follow Trulia, choosing instead to apply its own test which
considered whether the proposed settlement was in the shareholder's, the class's, and the
corporation's best interest. Gordon v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 568 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017).
177. See Rickey, supra note 126.
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have explicitly adopted Trulia's standard. 178 These alternative
viewpoints show that if suits are filed in a variety of different ju-
risdictions, it will be challenging to predict how the law will be ap-
plied in different situations.
2. How to Keep Suits in Delaware
If the goal is keeping the suits in Delaware, the question be-
comes how to do so. In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard touted forum
selection clauses as the natural counterpart to Trulia's heightened
standard of review.179 Forum selection clauses have also been pro-
posed by academics as a valuable way to keep suits in Delaware.18 0
In addition to receiving judicial and scholarly approval, as of 2014,
746 public companies in the United States had adopted forum se-
lection clauses.181 However, while forum selection clauses are ad-
vanced as a solution to Trulia's problems and are widely adopted,
the problems associated with forum selection clauses discussed
above are still present.
Forum selection clauses seem like the natural second step to bol-
ster Trulia, but they need to become more effective. The main prob-
lem is that defendants can waive forum selection provisions when
they do not work to their advantage. 18 2 Accordingly, a simple solu-
tion is to remove the optionality from exclusive forum provisions
through an amendment to DGCL section 115.183 Before corpora-
tions are subjected to litigation, they can commit to bringing future
suits back to Delaware. 184 Corporations have shown they are will-
ing to adopt forum selection clauses, since so many have done so
since the initial passage of DGCL section 115. Forcing corporations
to actually use these forum selection clauses essentially forces
them to remember why they adopted the clause in the first place,
eliminates the temptation that arises the instant litigation is filed,
178. For example, in In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly adopted Trulia, recognizing that because Dela-
ware has much more experience with this type of case, they should heed Delaware's advice.
In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
179. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016).
180. Fisch et al., supra note 12, at 605.
181. Cain et al., supra note 27, at 15.
182. See LaCroix, Litigation Reform Bylaws, supra note 28.
183. See Griffith, Private Ordering, supra note 44, at 14.
184. Id.
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and forces corporations to choose the long-term benefit over the
short-term incentives.
3. How This Ultimately Helps Curb Abuse
Once the suits are exclusively filed and/or heard in Delaware,
Delaware courts will apply the Trulia standard when reviewing
these settlements. As discussed above, plaintiffs' attorneys have
been hesitant to bring these suits to Delaware after Trulia.186 Pre-
sumably, if plaintiffs' attorneys knew any suit they filed would be
removed to Delaware, eventually they would stop bringing merit-
less suits. If corporations continue to adopt forum selection bylaws,
plaintiffs' ability to avoid Trulia will be limited further, as their
merger venue choices will be limited to Delaware and federal
court. 186 Thus, the Trulia standard "plus" a legislative amendment
to DGCL section 115 that eliminates the optionality from exclusive
forum provisions will solve the problem presented by disclosure-
only settlements for merger objection lawsuits.
C. Counterarguments
1. Not All Suits Belong in Delaware
In some situations, it does not make sense for a suit to be filed
in Delaware, and opponents may argue that overly broad forum
selection provisions do not account for such situations. However,
the primary situation where these cases should be filed and/or
heard elsewhere is when the state merger claim is appended to a
federal securities law. 187 In that situation, it makes sense for the
case to stay in federal court-thus reducing the costs and ineffi-
ciencies that would result from two similar cases being litigated
separately. Forum selection provisions will not bring these ap-
pended cases back to Delaware while leaving the other case in fed-
eral court, because judges will rarely decline jurisdiction over these
cases, as discussed above. 188 Alternatively, defendant corporations
could draft the forum selection provisions narrowly to account for
this situation.
185. See supra Part II.B.2.
186. See Cain et al., supra note 27, at 33.
187. See supra Part II.C.
188. See supra Part II.A.1.
556 [Vol. 52:529
2. Forum Selection Provisions Violate Directors' Fiduciary Duties
A second argument against non-optional forum selection provi-
sions is that directors need a 'fiduciary out,' which creates the flex-
ibility necessary to preserve directors' obligations to fulfill their fi-
duciary duties to shareholders if it is in the best interests of the
shareholders and the corporation that the litigation proceed out-
side of Delaware." 189 The forum selection provision needs to be
drafted in a way that directors may waive the forum selection pro-
vision if not doing so would violate the director's fiduciary duties.190
Delaware law is clear that a board of directors cannot be bound in
a way that violates the fiduciary duties the board owes to the
shareholders. 191 However, it is unlikely that a non-optional forum
selection provision would violate the fiduciary duties of a board of
directors. These settlements typically result in defendant corpora-
tions paying significant attorney's fees to dismiss meritless suits.
Paying significant amounts of money for nothing-essentially
wasting money-is certainly not in the best interests of the share-
holders. Thus, if adopting a non-optional forum selection bylaw
could prevent wasting money by subjecting the suits to the height-
ened scrutiny in Delaware, then it would actually be in the best
interests of the shareholders. Accordingly, the board would fulfill
its fiduciary duties by keeping these suits in Delaware.
3. Other States' Reaction to Delaware's Power Grab
A final concern is how other states will react to Delaware's man-
date of non-exclusive forum selection bylaws. Delaware, by insist-
ing that all these suits be litigated in Delaware court, is asserting
dominance over corporate law, and it is possible that states will
decline to accept Delaware's authority. For instance, in Galaviz v.
Berg, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California declined to enforce Oracle Corporation's forum selection
bylaw. 192 However, this case was decided years ago, and several
courts have recently deferred to Delaware's expertise in corporate
matters. For example, in In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation,
189. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 383 (2012).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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Judge Posner recognized that "Delaware's Court of Chancery sees
many more cases involving large transactions by public companies
than the federal courts of our circuit do, and so we should heed the
recent retraction by a judge of that court. . . ."193 Other courts have
made similar statements in the wake of Trulia, such as, "The
North Carolina Business Court has historically been guided in its
consideration of motions to approve, and award attorneys' fees in
connection with, 'disclosure-based' settlements of merger-based
class action litigation by the body of persuasive case law developed
by the Delaware courts over a period of many years." 194 While this
is certainly an assertion of power by Delaware, it is necessary given
Delaware's preeminence in corporate law, and it is likely that other
courts will recognize this as such.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Trulia, it is clear that, despite the success Trulia
has had in Delaware, more needs to be done. While there are a
variety of approaches proposed, each on its own presents signifi-
cant problems, indicating a need to combine approaches in order to
solve this problem. After analyzing each approach, it is clear that
Trulia is the best solution, although Trulia too comes with its own
problems. The main challenges Trulia faces in its effectiveness are
(i) keeping the suits in Delaware, or (ii) if the suits leave Delaware,
creating a uniform, nation-wide approach where all judges ap-
proach these settlements with a heightened standard of review.
Since these problems are intertwined, solving one can solve the
other, and it is more desirable to keep the suits in Delaware. Thus,
the next step forward in the battle against meritless merger objec-
tion suits ending in disclosure-only settlements is to find a way to
keep the suits in Delaware.
Delaware should amend DGCL section 115 to prohibit corpora-
tions from waiving their forum selection clauses. In doing so, the
Delaware legislature will fix many of the problems associated with
forum selection clauses, which in turn fixes the main problem with
the Trulia solution. If these problems are fixed, Trulia can become
even more effective than it has already been in Delaware, and this
193. 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
194. In re Newbridge Bancorp S'holder Litig., No. 15CVS9251, 2016 LEXIS 6885882, at
*2 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 2016).
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epidemic will be curtailed. Plaintiffs will be left with only a choice
between filing in Delaware or filing in federal court-neither of
which will be attractive options. Eventually, as settlements become
harder to win and no longer produce easy money, plaintiffs' attor-
neys will stop filing them and can move on to other issues, hope-
fully ones with more merit.
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